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This abstract provides some background information about the electronic voting exper­
iment that is planned in the Netherlands for the European Elections of 2004, and about 
our own involvement in the infrastructure for this experiment. The talk will elaborate 
further about the computer security issues involved, especially with respect to the use 
of formal methods for vote counting software.
Remote voting
Since the late 1990s voting in the Netherlands proceeds largely via voting machines. 
These are dedicated computers that record and store votes. These machines are under 
control of local governments, who put them up in voting stations on election days. These 
voting machines (and all new versions of them) have undergone independent evaluation 
before being admitted. However the internal mechanics is secret. Also, the evaluation 
reports are not public. Nevertheless, at the time of introduction, these machines were 
uncontroversial. They have been used in several elections, without causing problems. 
Currently, such machines are the subject of much discussion, see for instance [2].
In 2002 the parliament of the Netherlands adopted a temporary law that went a step 
further than voting via computers at voting stations. The law allows experimentation 
with what is called location-independent voting. It has resulted in plans to allow voting 
via internet and phone in the 2004 elections for the European Parliament. This involves a 
one-time, limited experiment, largely intended to explore the possibilities and to gather 
experience with the required techniques and procedures.
Low-tech approach
These electronic elections are set up for expatriats. They already have the possibility 
to participate in elections via voting by (ordinary) mail. To keep things simple, the 
approach in the electronic elections is modeled after this voting by mail. Hence, par­
ticipants in the electronic elections are required to register explicitly in advance. Upon 
registration, they have to submit a copy of their pasport and provide a self-chosen pin­
code, for authentication.
The whole organisation is fairly low-tech, and involves various codes for voter iden­
tification & authentication, and for candidate selection. In total, thousand different bal­
lots (with different candidate codes) will be distributed randomly, in order to ensure 
confidentiality.
The complicated registration procedure thus prevents national adoption of this ap­
proach. And because there is no national electronic identity card (yet), more high tech, 
crypto-based authentication procedures are not an option.
Organisation
The plans for these electronic elections have been elaborated by the Ministry of Inter­
nal Affairs, mostly in 2003. There has been an open bidding to build the software for 
these elections, and to run it as a service. This bidding has been won by LogicaCMG. 
Also, a panel of independent experts has been set-up, for feedback. The main advice 
from this panel1 was to run the project as open as possible, and to compartimentalise it 
maximally, so that fraud is difficult without cooperation of several parties. The Ministry 
owns the copyright on the software, and organises its own evaluations—again by sev­
eral parties. For instance, our group has participated in an evaluation of the robustness 
of the webservers, during an experiment in nov. 2003. Also, the intention is to make the 
source code available for inspection2, but it will probably not appear on the internet, 
like earlier in Australia3.
Vote counting
Late into the project the Ministry decided to open another separate, much smaller bid 
for the counting of the votes. It has been won by our group, on the basis of a pro­
posal that involves annotating the Java source code with correctness assertions from the 
Java Modeling Language JML [1]. These annotations are checked both with the run­
time assertion checker [4] and with the newest version of the Extended Static Checker, 
ESC/Java 2 [3], developed in part by our group. Details will be in the talk.
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